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Abstract 
Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem 
taxation has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result 
is  shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly as well as for Bertrand oligopoly when collusion is 
sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies. In a Cournot 
duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic costs, it is shown that the critical discount 
factor is lower with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax. However, in contrast to 
Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), it is shown that revenue is always higher with an ad 
valorem tax than with a specific tax. 
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1. Introduction 
An ad valorem tax and specific tax that result in the same consumer price will yield 
the same tax revenue under perfect competition, but an ad valorem tax will yield higher tax 
revenue than a specific tax under monopoly.1 The systematic comparison of ad valorem and 
specific taxes under oligopoly began with the article by Delipalla and Keen (1992). In a 
conjectural variation oligopoly model they demonstrate that an ad valorem tax is superior to a 
specific tax by considering tax reform that increases the ad valorem tax and reduces the 
specific tax in such a way that the first-order effect on revenue is zero (denoted as a P-shift). 
Skeath and Trandel (1994a) demonstrate that a specific tax can be replaced by a Pareto 
superior ad valorem tax under monopoly and under oligopoly if the tax rate is sufficiently 
high. The topic has also been addressed for tariffs in the international trade literature, see 
Kowalczyk and Skeath (1994), Skeath and Trandel (1994b). Assuming constant marginal 
cost, Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001) demonstrate that an ad valorem tax will yield 
higher tax revenue than a specific tax that results in the same consumer price. 
Recently, Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) compared the sustainability of collusion 
with ad valorem and specific taxation under Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly using the P-shift 
employed by Delipalla and Keen (1992). They consider infinitely-repeated supergames where 
collusion is sustained by either Nash-reversion or optimal punishment strategies, and claim 
that a shift from specific to ad valorem taxation makes it easier for firms to sustain collusion. 
Consequently, in contrast to conventional wisdom, they claim to demonstrate that the specific 
tax may yield higher tax revenue than an ad valorem tax when collusion is sustainable with 
the ad valorem tax but is not sustainable with the specific tax. However, their analysis seems 
to be flawed in the way that they use the P-shift, as it would involve either different tax rates 
or different changes in tax rates in the various phases of the supergame. Also, their 
                                                 
1 See Suits and Musgrave (1953) for a proof and details of the earlier literature on this topic going back 
to Wicksell in 1896. 
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demonstration of the superiority of a specific tax does not allow for the possibility of partial 
collusion when full collusion is not sustainable. 
In this paper, the sustainability of collusion with ad valorem and specific taxes will be 
reconsidered using a different approach. The assumption of constant marginal cost will be 
used so that it is possible to find a specific tax that results in the same consumer price as an 
ad valorem tax in all phases of the supergame with general demand functions under Cournot 
and Bertrand oligopoly. It will be shown that the critical discount factor required to sustain 
collusion is the same with an ad valorem tax as with a specific tax that results in the same 
price. Using specific functional forms, linear demand and quadratic costs, it will be shown 
that it is easier to sustain collusion with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results 
in the same price. However, in contrast to Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), it is shown that 
an ad valorem tax always yields higher revenue than a specific tax when the possibility of 
partial collusion is considered. 
2. Cournot Oligopoly 
Consider an infinitely-repeated Cournot oligopoly where firms produce a 
homogeneous product, and the firms have identical and constant marginal cost. There are two 
or more firms, 2n  , in the industry. All firms have the same cost function:  i ic q q , 
where iq  is the output of the ith firm and its marginal cost is   0ic q    , which is 
constant.2 The inverse demand function is:  P P Q , where P  is the consumer price and 
1
n
jj
Q q   is the total output of the firms, and it is assumed to be downward sloping so 
  0P Q  . Since this is a symmetric Cournot oligopoly, the existence of equilibrium is 
                                                 
2 The assumption of constant marginal cost is consistent with the assumption of Colombo and 
Labrecciosa (2013) that the cost function is convex, and with the assumption of Delipalla and Keen (1992) that 
the Seade (1980) stability condition is satisfied. Constant marginal cost is a fairly standard assumption in 
oligopoly models, especially, in the analysis of collusion. 
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implied by the results of McManus (1964, 1962). To ensure the uniqueness (and stability) of 
the Cournot equilibrium, it will be assumed that  1 0n P QP    , see Kolstad and 
Mathiesen (1987). The government imposes either an ad valorem consumption tax: 
(expressed as a proportion of the producer price), or a specific (per unit) consumption tax: t  
at the beginning of the game (stage zero), where 0   and 0t  .3 The comparison of the 
effects of the two forms of taxation will be achieved by comparing an ad valorem tax with a 
specific tax that results in the same price in all phases of the game. It will turn out that for a 
given ad valorem tax,  , the equivalent specific tax that results in the same price is: t  . 
After the government sets the ad valorem or specific tax, the Cournot oligopoly stage game is 
played an infinite number of times by the firms with profits discounted by a discount factor: 
 , where 0 1  . 
When the other 1n  firms each produce: jq , the profits of the ith firm with an ad 
valorem tax and with a specific tax are, respectively: 
 
  
  
1
1
1
i j
i i i
t
i i j i i i
P q n q
q q
P q n q q q tq
 
 
  
    
  (1) 
In an infinitely-repeated game, the folk theorem implies that collusion can be 
sustained at the monopoly price if the discount factor is sufficiently high. As in Colombo and 
Labrecciosa (2013), the sustainability of collusion will be analysed for the case of Nash-
reversion (grim trigger) strategies and for the case of optimal-punishment (stick and carrot) 
strategies. 
                                                 
3 Note that in Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) and Delipalla and Keen (1992) the ad valorem tax is 
expressed as a proportion of the consumer price, but this does not alter the results of the analysis. 
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2.1 Nash-Reversion Strategies 
Collusion can be sustained at the monopoly price in this infinitely repeated game by 
the threat of reversion to the Nash equilibrium as in Friedman (1971). The strategy of each 
firm, in the collusive phase, is to produce the joint profit-maximising output as long as all the 
other firms have done so in all the previous periods. If a firm deviates from the collusive 
phase then, in the deviation phase, it will maximise its profits while all the other firms 
produce the collusive output for one period. Following any deviation, from the next period 
onwards, in the punishment phase, all firms will produce the Cournot-Nash outputs. In the 
collusive phase, the firms maximise joint profits, 
1
n
jj
  , so denoting the joint profit-
maximising output of each firm as Mq
  or tMq , the first-order conditions for joint-profit 
maximisation with an ad valorem tax and with a specific tax are, respectively: 
         
       
0 1
1
0
M M M
M M M
i
t
t t t t t t
M M M M M M
i
P nq nq P nq
P nq nq P nq
q
P nq nq P nq t P nq nq P nq t
q
  
    
 
        
          
  (2) 
Note that if t   then the right-hand-sides of the two equations are equal and 
therefore tM M Mq q q
    so the collusive output of the firms is the same with both taxes, and 
it follows that the collusive (monopoly) price is the same with both taxes,  M MP nq P . 
When t  , the profits of each firm in the collusive phase of the game with an ad valorem 
tax and with a specific tax are, respectively: 
 
     
       
1 1
1 1
1 1
M M
M M M M M
t
M M M M M M M M M
P qq q P q q
q P q q tq P q q q


    
     
       
       
  (3) 
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When the ad valorem and specific tax both result in the same price and output, profits 
with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with the ad valorem tax. A similar result is 
obtained by Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001). 
In the deviation phase, while the other 1n  firms each produce the collusive output 
Mq , the deviating ith firm produces the profit-maximising deviation output Dq
  or tDq , given 
by the first-order conditions, which with an ad valorem tax and with a specific tax are, 
respectively: 
 
     
       
     
     
1 1
0
1
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 1
D M D D Mi
i
D M D D M
t
t t ti
D M D D M
i
t t t
D M D D M
P q n q q P q n q
q
P q n q q P q n q
P q n q q P q n q t
q
P q n q q P q n q t
  
  
 
 
 

        
       
         
       
  (4) 
Again, if t   then the right-hand sides of the two equations are equal so the outputs 
with the two taxes are the same, tD D Dq q q
   , and it follows that the price in the deviation 
phase is the same with both taxes,   1D M DP q n q P   . When t  , as in (3), the profits 
of the deviating firm in the deviation phase of the game with a specific tax are 1   times the 
profits with the ad valorem tax      1tD M D Mq q    . 
In the punishment phase, all the firms produce the symmetric Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium outputs Nq
  or tNq  given by the first-order conditions, which with an ad valorem 
tax and with a specific tax are, respectively: 
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         
       
0 1
1
0
N N Ni
N N N
i
t
t t t t t ti
N N N N N N
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P nq q P nq
P nq q P nq
q
P nq q P nq t P nq q P nq t
q
  
     
  
        
          
  (5) 
Again, if t   then the right-hand sides of the two equations are equal so the output 
is the same with the two taxes tN N Nq q q
   , and it follows that the price in punishment 
phase is the same with both taxes,  N NP nq P . When t  , as in (3), the profits of each 
firm in the punishment phase of the game (the Cournot-Nash equilibrium) with specific tax 
are 1   times the profits with the ad valorem tax:      1t N Nq q    . 
Collusion can be sustained by Nash-reversion strategies if the discounted present 
value of profits in the collusive phase exceeds the discounted present value of profits from 
deviation for one period followed by Cournot-Nash equilibrium profits in the punishment 
phase: 
      1 ,
1 1
z z z
M D M Nq q q z t
          (6) 
Collusion is sustainable if the discount factor is greater than the critical value defined 
when (6) holds with equality. Hence, the critical discount factors with an ad valorem tax and 
with a specific tax are, respectively: 
 
   
   
   
   
t t
tD M M D M M
t t
D M N D M N
q q q q
q q q q
 

 
       
      (7) 
When t  , profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with the ad 
valorem tax in each phase of the game. Hence, the critical discount factor required to sustain 
collusion is the same with both taxes. This leads to the following proposition: 
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Proposition 1. In the Cournot oligopoly supergame with collusion being supported by Nash 
reversion strategies the critical discount factor is the same with an ad valorem tax as with a 
specific tax that results in the same price in the collusive phase. 
If both taxes lead to the same price in the collusive phase then the critical discount 
factor is the same with both taxes.4 The intuition for this result is that although the two taxes 
have different effects on profits, they both have the same effect on the profits from collusion 
relative to the profits from deviation. Since relative profitability is unaffected by the form of 
taxation, the discount factor is the same with both taxes. 
This result contradicts proposition one of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), where it 
is claimed that a shift from a specific to an ad valorem tax will lead to a strict reduction in the 
critical discount factor, but their analysis seems to be flawed. To derive their results, they use 
the P-shift developed by Delipalla and Keen (1992) in a static oligopoly model with identical 
firms where specific and ad valorem taxation are used simultaneously. They consider a 
marginal tax reform that shifts the balance from specific taxation towards ad valorem 
taxation such that:  21 0dt Pd     , which implies that the (first-order) effect on tax 
revenue is zero.5 In proposition three, Delipalla and Keen (1992) show that this tax reform 
will lead to a strict reduction in profits, except in the polar case of joint profit-maximisation 
when profits are unaffected. When Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) apply this result to 
analyse collusion in an infinitely repeated game, they do not seem to appreciate that the price 
will be different in all three phases of the game ( , ,M D NP P P  in, respectively, the collusive, 
deviation and punishment phases), and hence the necessary tax reforms (P-shifts) will be 
different in each phase if the result of Delipalla and Keen (1992) is to be valid. Therefore, 
                                                 
4 Note that if both taxes lead to the same price in the collusive phase then prices with the two taxes will 
also be the same in the deviation phase and in the punishment phase. 
5 The formula here is different to the formula in Delipalla and Keen (1992) as the ad valorem tax is 
defined here as a proportion of the producer price rather than as a proportion of the consumer price. 
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either their analysis is invalid or they are considering different tax rates (or different changes 
in tax rates) in the various phases of the game. However, since the government sets the tax 
rates before the firms set their outputs, the government cannot set different taxes depending 
upon the phase of the game.6 
2.2 Optimal Punishment Strategies 
Collusion can be sustained at the monopoly price in this infinitely repeated game by 
the use of optimal symmetric punishments as in Abreu (1986), where the punishment lasts for 
one period and then the firms revert to collusion. The strategy of each firm, in the collusive 
phase, is to produce the collusive output provided there has been no deviation in the previous 
stage. Following a deviation, each firm will produce punishment output for one period, the 
punishment phase, and then revert to the collusive phase if all firms went along with the 
punishment. If a firm deviates from the punishment phase, then the punishment phase will 
continue for another period. In the collusive phase, the joint profit-maximising output of each 
firm will be the same with both taxes if t  , and is given by (2). Similarly, the output of a 
firm when it deviates from the collusive phase will be the same with both taxes if t  , and 
is given by (4). 
In the punishment phase, suppose that each firm produces output Pq , which is 
assumed to be the same with both taxes if t  . Later, it will be verified that this 
assumption is justified. If the output of each firm is Pq  then the price is  P PP nq P , and the 
profits of each firm in the punishment phase with the specific tax are 1   times the profits 
with the ad valorem tax:      1t P Pq q    . 
                                                 
6 For example, if the government set a different tax rate in the deviation phase it would have to know 
that a firm was going to deviate when it set its tax, and setting a different tax in the deviation phase would 
inform all the firms that a firm was going to deviate, which would lead all firms to deviate from collusion. 
9 
 
If the ith firm deviates from the punishment phase, while the other 1n  firms each 
produce the punishment output Pq , then the first-order conditions for the profit-maximising 
deviation by the ith firm with an ad valorem tax and with a specific tax are, respectively: 
 
     
       
     
     
1 1
0
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1 1 1
1 1 0
1 1
DP P DP DP Pi
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DP P DP DP P
t
t t ti
DP P P DP P
i
t t t
DP P DP DP P
P q n q q P q n q
q
P q n q q P q n q
P q n q q P q n q t
q
P q n q q P q n q t
  
  
 
 
 

        
       
         
       
  (8) 
Again, if t   then the right-hand sides of the two equations are equal so 
t
DP DP DPq q q
   , and it follows that the price when a firm deviates from the punishment 
phase is the same with both taxes,   1DP P DPP q n q P   . When t  , the profits of the 
firm deviating from the punishment phase of the game with the specific tax are 1   times 
the profits with the ad valorem tax:      1tD P D Pq q    . 
As in Abreu (1986), for the punishment to be credible, the gain from deviating in the 
punishment phase in any period is less than the present discounted value of the loss in the 
next period: 
         ,z z z zM P D P Pq q q q z t             (9) 
The optimal punishment output is the largest output that solves (9) when it holds with 
equality. Since profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with the ad valorem tax 
when t  , any solution for an ad valorem tax is also a solution for a specific tax. 
Therefore, as assumed above, the optimal punishment output is the same with both taxes: 
t
P P Pq q q
   . 
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It is also necessary that the firms find it profitable to continue with the supergame 
following any deviation from the collusive phase. The participation constraint of the firms 
requires that the discounted future profits from collusion must exceed any losses in the 
punishment phase:     1 0P Mq q     . The participation constraint of the firms is 
assumed to be satisfied.7 
For collusion to be sustainable, the gain from deviating in the collusive phase in any 
period is less than the present discounted value of the loss in the next period: 
         ,z z z zM P D M Mq q q q z t             (10) 
Collusion is sustainable if the discount factor is greater than the critical value defined 
when (10) holds with equality. Hence, the critical discount factors with an ad valorem tax and 
with a specific tax are, respectively: 
 
   
   
   
   
t t
tD M M D M M
P P t t
M P M P
q q q q
q q q q
 

 
       
      (11) 
When t  , profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with the ad 
valorem tax in each phase of the game so the critical discount factor required to sustain 
collusion is the same with both taxes. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2. In the Cournot oligopoly supergame with collusion being supported by 
optimal symmetric punishment strategies the critical discount factor is the same with an ad 
valorem tax as with a specific tax that results in the same price in the collusive phase. 
The result with optimal punishment strategies is the same as with Nash-reversion 
strategies, and the intuition is also the same. This result contradicts proposition two of 
Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), where it is claimed that a shift from a specific to an ad 
                                                 
7 With linear demand and differentiated products, Lambertini and Sasaki (1999) show that the 
participation constraint will only bind at the critical discount factor in the case of Bertrand oligopoly and perfect 
substitutes. 
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valorem tax will lead to a strict reduction in the critical discount factor. In this case there are 
two flaws in their analysis. First, rather than characterising the optimal punishment strategies 
in terms of the credibility condition (9) and the sustainability condition (10), they use the 
participation constraint of the firm, which they assume binds, but which Lambertini and 
Sasaki (1999) show only binds in extreme cases, although they only consider linear demand 
functions. Second, as with proposition one, the use of the P-shifts when prices differ in the 
various phases of the game is not valid. 
3. Bertrand Oligopoly 
Now consider the case of Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products rather than 
Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products. The demand functions facing the firms are 
symmetric and the demand facing the ith firm is:  ,i i iq D P P  where P  is the vector of 
prices set by the 1n  other firms. The rest of the model is the same as in section two so it is 
assumed that the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. The profits of the ith firm 
with an ad valorem tax and with a specific tax are, respectively: 
 
 
   
,
1
,
i
i i
t
i i i
P D P
P t D P
 
 
    
  
P
P
  (12) 
As in the previous section, the sustainability of collusion will be analysed for the case 
of Nash-reversion (grim trigger) strategies and for the case of optimal-punishment (stick and 
carrot) strategies. 
3.1 Nash-Reversion Strategies 
In the collusive phase, the firms set prices to maximise joint profits, 
1
n
jj
  , so 
denoting the joint profit-maximising (symmetric) price as MP
  or tMP , the first-order 
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conditions for joint profit maximisation with an ad valorem tax and with a specific tax are, 
respectively: 
 
     
       
       
, , ,
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, ,
, 0
, ,
, 0
i M M j M M i M MM
j ii i i
i M M j M M
M i M M
j ii i
t t t tt
i M M j M Mt t t
M i M M
j ii i i
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P p p
D P D P
P D P
p p
D P D P
P t D P
P p p
      
   
  
 
 




                 
           
             



P P P
P P
P
P P
P
  (13) 
Note that if t   then the solutions to both equations are the same: tM M MP P P    
and  ,i M M MD P qP . Hence, when t  , profits with the specific tax are 1   times the 
profits with the ad valorem tax as in the previous section:      1t M MP P    . 
In the deviation phase, while the other 1n  firms each set the collusive price MP , the 
deviating firm sets the profit-maximising deviation price DP
  or tDP  given by the first-order 
conditions, which with an ad valorem tax and with a specific tax are, respectively: 
 
   
     
     
, ,
0
1 1
,
, 0
,
, 0
i D M i D Mi D
i i
i D M
D i D M
i
tt
i D Mt ti
D i D M
i i
D P D PP
P p
D P
P D P
p
D P
P t D P
P p
  

 
  
 
 
          
    
      
P P
P
P
P
P
 (14) 
Again, if t   then the solutions to the two equations are the same: tD D DP P P    
and  ,D M DD P qP . When t  , profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits 
with the ad valorem tax as in the previous section:      1tD M D MP P    . 
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In the punishment phase, all the firms set the symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium 
prices, NP
  or tNP , defined by the first-order conditions, which with an ad valorem tax and 
with a specific tax are, respectively: 
 
   
     
     
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i i
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t tt
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i i
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 
  
  
 
 
          
    
      
P P
P
P
P
P
  (15) 
Again, if t   then the solutions to both equations are the same so tN N NP P P    and 
 ,i N N ND P qP . When t  , profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with 
the ad valorem tax as in the previous section:      1t N NP P    . 
Now consider the sustainability of collusion using Nash-reversion strategies. 
Analogously to (7), the critical discount factors with an ad valorem tax and with a specific 
tax are, respectively: 
 
   
   
   
   
t t
tD M M D M M
t t
D M N D M N
P P P P
P P P P
 

 
       
      (16) 
When t  , profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with the ad 
valorem tax in each phase of the game so the critical discount factor is the same with the ad 
valorem tax as with the specific tax. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. In the Bertrand oligopoly supergame with collusion being supported by Nash 
reversion strategies the critical discount factor is the same with an ad valorem tax as with a 
specific tax that results in the same prices in the collusive phase. 
14 
 
The result under Bertrand oligopoly is the same as under Cournot oligopoly, and the 
intuition is also the same. This result contradicts proposition four of Colombo and 
Labrecciosa (2013), where it is claimed that a shift from a specific to an ad valorem tax will 
lead to a strict reduction in the critical discount factor. The flaw in the analysis, as with 
proposition one, is that the use of the P-shifts when prices vary in the different phases of the 
game is not valid. 
3.2 Optimal-Punishment Strategies 
In the collusive phase, the joint profit-maximising price set by each firm will be the 
same with both taxes if t  , and is given by (13). Similarly, the price set by a firm when it 
deviates from the collusive phase will be the same with both taxes if t  , and is given by 
(14). In the punishment phase, suppose that all the firms set price PP  and output is 
 ,P P Pq D P P  then the profits of each firm in the punishment phase with a specific tax are 
1   times profits with an ad valorem tax:      1t P PP P    . 
If the ith firm deviates from the punishment phase, while the other 1n  firms each set 
price PP , then the first-order conditions for the profit maximising deviation with an ad 
valorem tax and with a specific tax are, respectively: 
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
 
  
 
 
          
    
      
P P
P
P
P
P
  (17) 
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Again, if t   then the solutions to the two equations are the same: tDP DP DPP P P    
and  ,DP P DPD P qP . When t  , the profits of the deviating firm with a specific tax are 
1   times the profits with an  ad valorem tax:      1tD P D PP P    . 
As in Abreu (1986), for the punishment to be credible, the gain from deviating in the 
punishment phase in any period is less than the present discounted value of the loss in the 
next period: 
        M P D P PP P P P           (18) 
The optimal punishment price is the lowest price that solves (18) when it holds with 
equality. Since profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with the ad valorem tax 
when t  , any solution for an ad valorem tax is also a solution for a specific tax. 
Therefore, as assumed above, the optimal punishment price is the same with both taxes: 
t
P P PP P P
   . 
For collusion to be sustainable, the gain from deviating in the collusive phase in any 
period is less than the present discounted value of the loss in the next period: 
        M P D M MP P P P           (19) 
Collusion is sustainable if the discount factor is greater than the critical value defined 
when (19) holds with equality. Hence, the critical discount factors with an ad valorem tax and 
with a specific tax are, respectively: 
 
   
   
   
   
t t
tD M M D M M
P P t t
M P M P
P P P P
P P P P
 

 
       
      (20) 
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When t  , profits with the specific tax are 1   times the profits with the ad 
valorem tax in each phase of the game so the critical discount factor required to sustain 
collusion is the same with both taxes. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 4. In the Bertrand oligopoly supergame with collusion being supported by 
optimal symmetric punishment strategies the critical discount factor is the same with an ad 
valorem tax as with a specific tax that results in the same prices in the collusive phase. 
This result contradicts proposition five of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013), where it 
is claimed that a shift from a specific to an ad valorem tax will lead to a strict reduction in the 
critical discount factor. 
4. Cournot Duopoly with Linear Demand and Quadratic Costs 
In the previous two sections, the assumption of constant marginal cost allowed clear-
cut results to be obtained with general demand functions. This section will consider the case 
of increasing marginal cost, but this will require the use of specific functional forms so that 
explicit solutions can be obtained for outputs and profits. Also, this section will consider the 
possibility of partial collusion when full collusion is not possible. 
Consider an infinitely-repeated Cournot duopoly, 2n  , where firms produce a 
homogeneous product, and the firms have identical quadratic cost functions. The ith firm has 
the cost function:   2 2i i ic q q q   , where 0   and 0  , and hence its marginal cost is 
  0i ic q q     , which is increasing in output if 0   and constant if 0  . The inverse 
demand function is linear:    1 2P Q q q    , where   1 0t       and 0  . It 
is useful to define the variable 0    , which is the slope of a firm’s marginal cost curve 
relative to the slope of the demand function, and is equal to zero in the case of constant 
marginal cost. Also, to simplify the expressions later in the paper, it is useful to define the 
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following terms:   1 0A t       ,  1 0IB I      , where 1,2,...,6I  , 
   21 3 5 2 0D         and    22 3 4 2 0D        . Note that only A  is a 
function of the specific tax, t , while 1D  and 2D  do not depend upon either the ad valorem or 
the specific tax. With these demand and cost functions, the profits of the-ith firm when its 
competitor produces output jq , given the ad valorem and specific taxes, are: 
 
      2
1 1 2
i j i j i
i i i i i i i
P q q q q qq c q tq q q tq
    
            (21) 
It is straightforward to solve for the joint profit-maximising output and profits of each 
firm as functions of the two taxes: 
    
2
4 4
,
2 1M M
A Aq q
B B
       (22) 
The solutions for an ad valorem tax are obtained by setting the specific tax equal to 
zero, 0t  , and are denoted by a superscript  . Similarly, the solutions for a specific tax are 
obtained by setting the ad valorem tax equal to zero, 0  , and are denoted by a superscript 
t . For example, the joint profit-maximising output is   4Mq B        with an ad 
valorem tax and is    4tMq t        with a specific tax. 
4.1 Nash-Reversion Strategies 
When the discount factor is less than the critical value, it is not possible to sustain 
collusion at the joint profit-maximising price, but partial collusion at a lower price may still 
be possible using Nash-reversion strategies. To find the maximum level of collusion that can 
be sustained for a given discount factor, let Cq  be the collusive output. Then, the profits of 
the firms from colluding are: 
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     4
2
2 1
C C
C
q A B q
q
 
    (23) 
If the other firm produces output Cq  then the profit-maximising output and profits for 
a firm that deviates are: 
       
2
2 2
,
2 1
CC
D C D C
A qA qq q q
B B
   
     (24) 
Following a deviation by either firm, in the punishment phase, both firms will 
produce the Cournot-Nash output forever thereafter. It is straightforward to show that the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium output and profits are: 
    
2
2
2
3 3
,
2 1N N
A A Bq q
B B
       (25) 
The lowest collusive output that can be sustained using Nash-reversion trigger 
strategies for any given discount factor can be obtained by solving: 
       D C CD C N
q q
q q
   
    (26) 
Using (23), (24) and (25) to solve (26) for the collusive output as a function of the 
discount factor yields: 
      3 2 323 3C
A B B B
q
B B
  
     (27) 
Full collusion at the joint profit-maximising price can be sustained if the discount 
factor is greater than some critical value, and this critical value can be obtained by solving 
 C Mq q  , which yields the critical discount factor:   23 617 2 1N B B     . Note that 
with constant marginal cost, 0  , the critical discount factor is: 9 17N  , which does not 
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depend upon the tax rates. With increasing marginal cost, setting 0t   yields the critical 
discount factor with an ad valorem tax and setting 0   yields the critical discount factor 
with a specific tax, respectively: 
  
 
 
22
3
6
3
,
17 2 1 17 2 6
t
N N N
B
B
      
        (28) 
The critical discount factor with the specific tax does not depend upon the tax rate 
whereas the critical discount with the ad valorem tax is decreasing in the tax rate, 
0N
    , and they are equal when there are no taxes, 0t   . Therefore, there is a range 
of values for the discount factor, , tN N
     , where full collusion can be sustained with an 
ad valorem tax, but cannot be sustained with a specific tax. In this range of values for the 
discount factor, Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) claim that tax revenue may be higher with 
a specific tax than that with an ad valorem tax that yields the same price. However, they 
assume that if full collusion is not possible then the result will be the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium even though partial collusion can still be sustained with a specific tax. If instead 
one allows for the possibility of partial collusion with a specific tax then for , tN N
      
there will be full collusion with an ad valorem tax but partial collusion with a specific tax. 
The specific tax can be set so that the price will be the same as with the ad valorem tax so 
 tM Cq q  . Since both taxes lead to the same price and output, tax revenue will be higher 
with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax if the difference in revenue per unit: 
 1N MR P t      is positive. When 0, N     there will be partial collusion with both 
taxes and if the specific tax is set so that    tC Cq q    then the difference in revenue per 
unit is:  1N CR P t     . When ,1tN     there will be full collusion with both taxes 
and if the specific tax is set so that tM Mq q
   then the difference in revenue per unit is: 
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 1N MR P t     . Allowing for all three possibilities, it can be shown that the difference 
in revenue per unit is: 
  
   
  
 
  
 
      
          
        
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4 1
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2 2 2 2
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2 2 2 2 2
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                    
      
         
        
  (29) 
The only terms where the sign is not immediately clear are E  and F , but these terms 
can be signed quite easily. Since the term E  is a concave quadratic in the discount factor, 
which is positive when 0   and when N  , it will be positive for 0, N    . Since the 
term F  is positive when N   and it is increasing in the discount factor, it will be positive 
for , tN N
     . Therefore, an ad valorem tax yields a higher revenue than a specific tax that 
results in the same price in the collusive phase. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 5. In the Cournot duopoly supergame with linear demand and quadratic costs 
where collusion is supported by Nash-reversion trigger strategies, tax revenue is higher with 
an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same price in the collusive 
phase. 
Allowing partial collusion when the discount factor is lower than the critical value, 
restores the conventional wisdom that an ad valorem tax yields higher revenue than a specific 
tax that results in the same price. 
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4.2 Optimal Punishment Strategies 
Partial collusion can also be sustained using optimal punishment strategies as in 
Abreu (1986). The profits in the collusive phase when each firm produces output Cq  are 
given by (23), and the profits if a firm deviates from the collusive phase are given by (24). 
Similarly, in the punishment phase, the profits when each firm produces output Pq  are: 
     4
2
2 1
P P
P
q A B q
q
 
    (30) 
The output and profits when a firm deviates from the punishment phase and the other 
firms produce the collusive output Pq  are: 
       
2
2 2
,
2 1
PP
D P D P
A qA qq q q
B B
   
     (31) 
With partial collusion, the outputs in the collusive and the punishment phases are 
obtained by solving the credibility and sustainability conditions for a given discount factor, as 
in Abreu (1986): 
 
        
        
D P P C P
D C C C P
q q q q
q q q q
    
    
  
  
  (32) 
Solving for the outputs in the collusive and punishment phases as functions of the 
discount factor, and ignoring the trivial solution where both outputs are equal to the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium outputs, C P Nq q q  , yields: 
    2 23 2 3 23 3
3 3
4 , 4C P
A Aq B B q B B
B B
                (33) 
Note that the two outputs are linear in the discount factor. Full collusion at the joint 
profit-maximising price can be sustained if the discount factor is greater than some critical 
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value, and this critical value can be obtained by solving  C Mq q  , which yields the critical 
discount factor: 23 2 44P B B B  . Note that with constant marginal cost, 0  , the critical 
discount factor is: 9 32P  , which does not depend upon the tax rates. With increasing 
marginal cost, setting 0t   yields the critical discount factor with an ad valorem tax and 
setting 0   yields the critical discount factor with a specific tax, respectively: 
    
22
3
2 4
3
,
4 4 2 4
t
P P P
B
B B
    
      (34) 
The critical discount factor with the specific tax does not depend upon the tax rate 
whereas the critical discount with the ad valorem tax is decreasing in the tax rate, 
0P
    , and they are equal when there are no taxes, 0t   . Therefore, there is a range 
of values for the discount factor, , tP P
     , where full collusion can be sustained with an 
ad valorem tax, but cannot be sustained with a specific tax. However, partial collusion can be 
sustained with a specific tax. 
As in the case of Nash-reversion strategies, the specific tax can be set so that the price 
in the collusive phase is the same as with the ad valorem tax. Since both taxes lead to the 
same output, and again allowing for all three possibilities, the difference in revenue per unit 
with the ad valorem and specific tax can be shown to be: 
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  
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    
                   
   
         
     
  (35) 
The only terms where the sign is not immediately clear are G  and H , but these terms 
can be signed quite easily. Since the term G  is a concave quadratic, which is positive when 
0   and when P  , it will be positive for 0, P    . Since the term H  is positive 
when P
   and it is increasing in  , it will be positive for , tP P     . Therefore, an ad 
valorem tax yields a higher revenue than a specific tax that results in the same price in the 
collusive phase. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 6. In the Cournot duopoly supergame with linear demand and quadratic costs 
where collusion is supported by optimal-punishment strategies, tax revenue is higher with an 
ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same price in the collusive phase. 
Allowing partial collusion when the discount factor is lower than the critical value, 
restores the conventional wisdom that an ad valorem tax yields higher revenue than a specific 
tax that results in the same price. 
5. Conclusions 
The analysis has compared the effects of ad valorem and specific taxes that result in 
the same price on the sustainability of collusion in infinitely repeated oligopoly models. 
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Assuming constant marginal cost, it was shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem 
taxation has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result 
was shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly, with homogeneous products and general demand 
functions, as well as for Bertrand oligopoly, with differentiated products and general demand 
functions, when collusion was sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-
punishment strategies. The intuition for these results is that, although both taxes have 
different effects on profits, they have the same effect on relative profits because profits with 
an ad valorem tax are always proportional to profits with a specific tax. These results 
contradicted the results of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2013) who claimed that a shift from 
specific to ad valorem taxation leads to a strict reduction in the critical discount factor. 
However, their analysis is flawed as it uses P-shifts in all the phases of the game even though 
prices will be different in each phase of the game. 
Also, in a Cournot duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic costs, it was 
shown that the critical discount factor was lower with an ad valorem tax than with a specific 
tax when marginal cost was increasing. In this case, there is a range of values for the discount 
factor where full collusion is possible with an ad valorem tax, but is not possible with a 
specific tax. In this region, in contrast to conventional wisdom, Colombo and Labrecciosa 
(2013) argue that revenue may be higher with a specific tax than with an ad valorem tax, but 
they assume that the outcome will be Nash (Cournot or Bertrand) equilibrium if the discount 
factor is lower than the critical value. However, partial collusion is still possible when the 
discount factor is lower than the critical value. Allowing for the possibility of partial 
collusion, it was shown that revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a 
specific tax thereby restoring conventional wisdom. 
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